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Eight states in Africa that have federal or federal-type government systems and most of 
these federations emerged in the post-Cold War period. The African federations are in 
various degrees characterised by a limited extent of self-rule and the concentration of 
power at the centre. The question this article addresses is whether, and if so, how, the 
federal character of the state organisation impacts on the administration of justice. In other 
words, is the judicial branch of government also part of the federal arrangements, and if so, 
how has that been manifested? Four sub-questions are posed in this regard. First, does the 
structure of the judicial institutions also follow the vertical division of powers between the 
central and subnational governments? Secondly, given the non-centrist or centrist structure 
of the courts, how are judges appointed? Thirdly, as language and ethnic diversity are often 
the key reasons for the establishment of federal arrangements, how is the language 
question dealt within in the administration of justice? Finally, what role have the courts 















There are eight states in Africa that have federal or federal-type government systems 
and most of these federations emerged in the post-cold period; South Africa (1994); 
Ethiopia (1995); Nigeria (1999, re-establishing earlier federal constitutions); the Comoros 
(1996, 2001); the Democratic Republic of Congo (2005); the Sudan (2005), Kenya (2010); 
South Sudan (2011) and Somalia (2012). Federal system in these countries was adopted 
mostly as an institutional response to the challenges of inter-ethnic conflicts. The African 
federations are in various degrees characterised by a limited extent of self-rule and the 
concentration of power at the centre. The key characteristics of this style of federalism are: 
the fracturing of subnational governments into small units; a limited devolution of powers 
(mainly through concurrent powers which are then dominated by the centre); centralising 
taxing powers and rendering subnational governments dependent on transfers; the central 
dominance of intergovernmental relations; and intervention powers.I  
The question this article addresses is whether, and if so, how, the federal character of 
the state organisation impacts on the administration of justice. In other words, is the 
judicial branch of government also part of the federal arrangements, and if so, how has that 
been manifested. Four sub-questions are posed in this regard:  
First, does the structure of the judicial institutions also follow the vertical division of 
powers between the central and subnational governments? The organisation and functions 
of a judiciary in a federal system may take one or a combination of two approaches; non-
centralised (which includes dualist model) or centralised approaches.II In the first case 
courts are established at a federal and state levels. The courts at each level of government 
exercise judicial functions on matters that are within the exclusive legislative competences 
of the relevant level of government. Hence state courts decide cases based on state laws 
and federal courts entertain cases having federal elements. In the dualist model state courts 
have a final say on state matters while federal courts have final decision-making powers on 
federal matters.III In a centralised (or unitary) approach, judicial functions are essentially a 
national competence. The constitution establishes a single judiciary which is funded by the 
federal government. Courts in such federations have only deconcentrated branches at 
subnational level and these are not considered to be the third branch of the latter. Cheryl 
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Saunders also makes similar distinctions between three categories: a dualist system, where 
there is no link between the federal and state judiciaries; an integrated system where there 
are some linkages between the two distinct levels of courts; and a single judicial authority 
which resides under the central government.IV For her, the US is an example of a dual 
system, Germany, Canada, Nigeria and India of an integrated system, while South Africa is 
of a single court authority system.V For the purposes of this essay, we use the broad 
distinction between a non-central and a centrist (single judicial authority) systems. Given 
these models, what model(s) prevail among the four ‘federations’, and what are the 
consequences of such model(s) in practice?  
Secondly, given the non-centrist or centrist structure of the courts, how are judges 
appointed? In the non-centrist system, does the centre play any role in the appointment of 
the judiciary as the subnational level? Conversely, do subnational governments in centrist 
system have a say in the appointment of judges functioning in their territory?  
Thirdly, as language and ethnic diversity are often the key reasons for the establishment 
of federal arrangements, how is the language question dealt within in the administration of 
justice?  
Finally, what role have the courts played in realisation of the federal character of the 
state? Have courts in non-centrist systems been more protective of federalism or 
devolution than those in a unitary system? What does their jurisprudential record suggest? 
Any such role, however, is premised on the practice of judicial independence.  
 This contribution seeks to answer these questions with reference to the four-major 
federal/federal-type systems in Africa, i.e. Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa. The 
essay argues, first, that Kenya and South Africa, reflecting the general ethos of their 
centralised federations, have established unitary judicial systems. In these countries, the 
judiciary is firmly a national function. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Nigeria have 
federalised court structures; the judicial function is split between the centre and subnational 
government. However, the non-centralism of the judicial system in these two federations 
does not produce end result a very distinctive from South Africa’s and Kenya’s centrist 
system. Secondly, the non-centrist system in Nigeria and Ethiopia does not preclude 
federal involvement in the appointment of the state judiciary. In both a non-centrist 
(Nigeria) and a unitary system (South Africa), subnational governments can play a role in 
the appointments of federal/national judiciary through the second house of Parliament. 
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Thirdly, apart from Ethiopia, the other three countries display a strong unitary character in 
allowing one official court language. Finally, although the federal jurisprudence of the apex 
courts (excluding Ethiopia, where a political body is the final interpreter of the 
Constitution) may in Nigeria and South Africa tend towards favouring the centre, their 
independence from the executive is more important for the survival of the federal systems.  
The article analyses the judiciary in Ethiopia followed by Nigeria, Kenya and South 
Africa with reference to the four questions. It concludes with a few comparative 
observations.  
 
2. The Ethiopian federal system 
 
Ethiopia is federal country made up of nine states and two federal cities.VI 
Underpinned by the need to manage the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian people, the 
boundaries of the states are delineated along ethnic lines. None of the states is however 
ethnically homogenous. Indeed, only five of them have a numerically dominant ethnic 
communityVII while the rest have none. The Constitution envisages that intra-regional 
ethnic diversity would be territorially managed at the local level. Hence, five multi-ethnic 
states have established ethnic-based sub-regional units called special woredas and special (ethnic) 
zones. VIII  
The Ethiopian federal system is often referred to as a dual federal system in that it 
divides political, administrative, and financial as well as judicial powers between the federal 
and state governments.IX This duality is however vapid since the balance in the 
constitutional division of power between the federal government and the states decidedly 
tilts in favour of the former. The Constitution contains a long list of federal exclusive 
competences - 22 broadly defined items. It leaves residual powers to the states over and 
above the short list of exclusive state competences it contains. Yet the Constitution 
provides the federal government with a significant leeway allowing it to assume most of the 
state competences thereby taming the duality of the federal system.X This is also reflected 
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2.1. Structure and jurisdiction of courts  
The court structure is as a rule based on the principle of duality at federal and state 
levels and each exists side by side.XI The Constitution establishes the federal Supreme 
Court and authorises Parliament to establish federal high and first instance courts in some 
or all parts of the country, a decision that Parliament has to approve with a special 
majority.XII The Constitution also explicitly provides that each state would have a supreme 
court, a high court and courts of first instance.XIII Although proceeding from a base of 
duality, the structure and functions of the federal and state courts also show some degree 
of integration. The federal government has established federal first instance and high 
courts in the two federal cities since the latter do not have constitutionally defined judicial 
powers. It has also issued a proclamation establishing federal high courts in Afar, Somali, 
the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), Benishangul-Gumuz, 
and Gambella states.XIV However, in the states where the federal government has not 
established federal courts, state high courts and states supreme courts are constitutionally 
authorised to assume the jurisdictions of the federal first instance and high courts, 
respectively.XV 
The Constitution also contains a principle of duality in the jurisdictional division of 
federal and state courts. Federal courts are empowered to resolve disputes relating to 
federal matters using federal laws and international treaties whereas state courts are 
empowered to resolve legal disputes relating to states matters, based on state laws.XVI This 
means federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction on most criminal matters, except those that 
are covered by state laws. State courts have exclusive jurisdiction on most civil matters 
relating to family, succession, property and the like, with the exception of the ten items that 
are listed under Article 5 of Proclamation 25 (1996).XVII In the two federal cities, the federal 
courts exercise jurisdiction on all federal matters and on matters that are, under the 
Constitution, listed as state competences, including those relating to family and succession. 
The federal Supreme Court has the power to provide a final and authoritative 
interpretation on specific provisions of a federal law.XVIII To this extent the dual federal 
principle is reflected in the functional jurisdiction of the federal and state courts. 
The Constitution provides that a state supreme court has ‘the highest and final judicial 
power over State matters’.XIX Article 80(3) of the Constitution also provides that a state 
supreme court has a power of cassation on the interpretation of a state law. It is however 
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unclear whether a state Supreme Court has the last word on the interpretation of a specific 
provision in a state law since the Constitution also provides that the federal Supreme Court 
has ‘power of cassation over any final court decision containing a basic error of law’. Moreover, 
Article 10 of Proclamation 25 (1996), the Proclamation establishing federal courts, provides 
that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has power of cassation on final 
decisions of the [state] Supreme Court that the latter rendered as a regular division or in its 
appellate jurisdiction.  
There are two opposing arguments on the issue above. The first argument is that the 
phrase ‘over any final court decision’ implies that the power of cassation of the federal Supreme 
Court extends to reviewing decisions of a state supreme court, including those of the 
cassation divisions of a state supreme court.XX The other argument is that the 
aforementioned phrase, viewed in light of the dual federal principle, should be construed to 
mean only a final decision of federal courts or a decision of a state court that the latter 
passed in its capacity as a federal court. This argument further goes that Article 10 of 
Proclamation 25 (1996) does not explicitly authorise the federal Supreme Court to review 
the decision of the cassation division of state supreme courts. It simply states that the 
federal Supreme Court can review the decisions of a state supreme court that the latter 
passed ‘as a regular division or in its appellate jurisdiction’. This refers, so the argument 
goes, to a decision that a state Supreme Court passed on federal matter in its capacity as a 
federal high court. The cassation division of a state supreme court thus has a final say on 
the interpretation of state laws.  
In light of the dual federal principle, the second argument seems to be more 
convincing. However, practice shows that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme 
Court reviews decisions of the cassation divisions of state supreme courts. One can thus 
approach the Federal Supreme Court if he/she can show prima face case that a state 
supreme court, including the cassation division of the state supreme court, has made basic 
error in interpreting a specific provision in a state law.XXI  
The power to resolve constitutional disputes is arguably within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the House of Federation (HoF). There is little agreement regarding whether 
federal courts can use the Constitution to resolve legal disputes. Some argue federal courts 
can do so even though they cannot make a final and authoritative pronouncement on 
constitutional issues. Others maintain federal courts can use only ordinary federal laws, and 
 
Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
109 
never the Constitution, to resolve legal disputes. In practice, the courts hardly invoke the 
constitution to decide cases.XXII Likewise, the power to interpret state constitutions is 
entrusted in an organ called Constitution Interpretation Commission (CIC). In the SNNP, 
the power to interpret the state constitution belongs to the Council of Nationalities, the 
second chamber of the state council and a mirror image of the HoF. While the HoF has 
dealt with several constitutional matters, the practice with respect to the interpretation of 
state constitutions is unclear.  
 
2.2 Appointment of judges  
The manner in which judges of federal and state courts are nominated and appointed 
shows both elements of federal duality and integration. The final say on the appointment 
of judges of federal courts resides in the House of People Representatives (HoPRs) while 
state councils have final decision-making power on the appointment of judges of state 
courts. To this extent the appointment of judges of federal and state courts is based on 
duality. However, as will be seen below, the involvement of the Federal Judicial 
Administration Council (FJAC) in the appointment of judges of state courts brings about 
an element of fusion.  
The Constitution implicitly provides that there would be an FJAC which would have 
the power to nominate persons who it deems are suitable for appointment as federal 
judges. The Constitution, while implying its establishment, is silent on who its members are 
and how they are appointed. This is regulated by a federal law which provides that the 
FJAC would be composed of the presidents of the three federal courts, the vice president 
of the Supreme Court, three members of Parliament, a Minister of Justice, a judge 
representing the three federal courts, a law professor of a higher education institution and a 
distinguished citizen.XXIII Clearly the states do not have representation in the FJAC. 
The FJAC hence submits a list of its nominees to the Prime Minister (PM) and the 
latter in turn submits the names of the nominees to HoPRs for confirmation.XXIV The PM 
seems to have the discretion not to submit to the HoPRs the names of some or all of those 
that the FJAC nominates. He/she cannot, however, submit his own list of nominees. The 
PM has the authority to nominate the president and vice presidents of the Federal Supreme 
Court who would then be appointed by the HoPR.XXV  
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The Constitution also provides that a State Judicial Administration Council (SJAC) 
would be established in each state with the power to nominate judges of state courts and 
submit the names of the nominees to a state council.XXVI The Constitution does not 
envisage the involvement of a regional president in the appointment of judges of state 
courts since the SJAC is authorised to directly submit the names of its nominees to the 
state council (legislature). He/she is however authorised to appoint the president and vice 
president of the state supreme court subject to confirmation by the state council.XXVII A 
SJAC has the obligation to seek the opinion of the FJAC regarding its nominees for 
judgeship of state high and supreme courts.XXVIII The SJAC is also required to disclose to 
the state council the FJAC’s opinion, if any, regarding the nominees.XXIX The FJAC is 
hence involved in the appointment of judges of state courts. This brings an element of 
fusion in the judicial federalism even though the FJAC does not seem to have more power 
than giving its opinion on the nominees of the SJAC. The opinion of the FJAC on the 
SJAC’s nominees is required seemingly because, as was indicated above, state high and 
supreme courts also act as federal first instance and high courts respectively. Yet, there is 
nothing in the Constitution that relieves the SJAC from consulting the FJAC even when 
the federal government establishes its own first instance and high courts in the state. This 
clearly tames the duality in the structuring and functioning of federal and state courts.  
The state constitutions establishing special woredas and zones (ethnic local government 
units) provide that special woredas and zones should be consulted regarding the 
appointment of judges who would be presiding in state first instance and/or high courts 
having jurisdiction in the territorial areas of the special woreda or zone. XXX This reflects the 
fact that the federal system is underpinned by accommodation of ethnic diversity.  
 
2.3 Language  
Amharic (Amharigna), a language that is supposedly spoken by about 70 percent of the 
Ethiopian population, is constitutionally designated to be the working language the federal 
government.XXXI The Constitution allows the states to choose and adopt their own working 
languages.XXXII Accordingly Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali and Tigray each has decided to 
use the language of the ethnic community that is in majority in it. The other four states 
have opted to use Amharic as their working language. The working language of the federal 
government is by default the working language of federal courts while the working 
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language of a state also serves as the working language of the state’s courts. The federal and 
state governments, except the Hareri region, are monolingual in a sense each has only a 
single working language. The same is, therefore, true to federal and state courts. 
It is unclear whether a state Supreme Court and high courts are required to use 
Amharic for hearing and deciding cases when acting as a federal high court. Practice shows 
that state courts use the working language of the relevant state government when hearing 
both state and federal matters. The whole proceeding is translated to Amharic if and when 
the case is taken on appeal to the federal Supreme Court or its Cassation Division. As 
stated above, some of the special woredas and zones, especially those in the Amhara and 
SNNP states, have adopted local working languages. It is unclear whether a state first 
instance and high courts that exercises jurisdiction in the special woredas and zones, have to 
use the working language of the latter in their proceedings. However, even if that is the 
case, state laws are hardly ever translated into sub-state official languages.  
Regardless of the language that a state court uses for administering justice, the 
Constitution recognises the rights of an arrested person to be informed of the reason of 
his/her arrest and his/her right to remain silent in the language he/she understands. It also 
recognises the right of an accused person, if he/she seeks, to receive the assistance of an 
interpreter at the state’s expense.XXXIII  
 
2.4 Federal jurisprudence  
It is often assumed that the regular courts of a federation would give ‘shape and 
texture’ to the federal system when they are established based on federal duality. They do 
so by simply applying the laws of their coordinate legislatures and by interpreting the 
constitutions of the relevant level of government.XXXIV As indicated above, the Ethiopian 
courts are established principally based on federal duality. The Ethiopian federal and state 
courts have however played a minimal role in terms of developing federal jurisprudences or 
giving shape and texture to the Ethiopian federal system.XXXV There is barely any decision 
that the court passed impacting the federal system. There are several factors hindering the 
courts from playing any role in this regard. As indicated above, state courts in Ethiopia do 
not have the final word on the interpretation of state laws since their decisions are 
reviewed by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. A study by Yonatan 
Fessha and Zemelak Ayele shows that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme 
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Court has reversed over 60 per cent of the cases that state supreme courts or their 
cassation divisions decided based on state laws.XXXVI By insisting on uniformity, the Federal 
Supreme Court has thus undermined the role that state courts could have played in terms 
of giving ‘shape and texture’ to the federal system by interpreting state laws. Moreover, as 
stated above, state courts do not have the authority to interpret, even to refer to, state 
constitutions. Their decisions are thus often found to be inconsistent with certain 
constitutional principles or individual rights that are guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the 
federal Constitution; inconsistencies that the state courts could have avoided by simply 
referring to the bills of rights in state constitutions.  
The federal courts also play minimal role in terms of judicially impacting the federal 
system since they are not empowered to apply the federal Constitution to resolve legal 
disputes. Moreover, despite the constitutional guarantees to this effect,XXXVII state and 
federal courts lack institutional independence and the judges lack personal independence 
which are critical for developing federal jurisprudence. The Ethiopian courts operate in a 
political context which is dominated by a single party, EPRDF. There is thus a general 
perception that judges both at federal and state level lack personal independence since they 
are allegedly appointed and dismissed based on political consideration and that the judges 
often face interferences by politicians.XXXVIII  
 
2.5. Concluding remarks  
Ethiopia has a dual federal system in which government is organised at federal and 
state level. The duality of the federal system is also reflected in the manner that the regular 
courts are structured and their jurisdictions are delimited. The duality is not however 
perfect since the state courts also entertain federal cases and that the FJAC is involved in 
the appointment of judges of state courts. Most importantly the decision of the highest 
state court is reviewed by the federal Supreme Court. Indeed, state courts serve the 
purpose of accommodating the linguistic diversity in the country. However, the fact that 
they have no final say on state matters and that their final decisions are reviewed by federal 









Nigeria has been a federation since it attained independence in 1962, which makes it 
the oldest federation in Africa. The country has lurched back and forth between democracy 
and military rule until, in 1999, it returned again to civilian rule. The Nigerian federation is 
composed of 36 states, a federal capital territory (FCT), Abuja, and a federal government. 
The Nigerian Constitution allocates an extensive list of exclusive powers to the federal 
government, while the states are endowed with the residual powers as well as a list of 
powers shared with the federal government. The Nigerian federal system is viewed as 
overly centralised, a legacy of the military rule the country underwent for over four 
decades.XXXIX As will be discussed below, features of centralisation are also reflected in the 
manner that the judiciary is structured and functions.  
 
3.1. The structure and jurisdiction of courts  
The judiciary in Nigerian reflects the duality of the country’s federal system in that 
there are courts that are established for the federation as well as those that are established 
for the states.XL The federal and state courts are as a rule separate and exist side by side and 
exercise judicial functions on matters that are assigned to the federal government and the 
states, respectively. At the apex of the federal judiciary is the Federal Supreme Court.XLI A 
Court of Appeal and a Federal High Court are established below the Supreme Court. The 
High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal and the Customary Court of Appeal are also 
considered parts of the federal judicature.XLII 
The highest judicial organs at state level are a state High Court, a state Sharia Court of 
Appeal, and a state Customary Court of Appeal.XLIII These three judicial offices are of 
equal rank but apply different laws for resolving cases. The states and the FCT are also 
authorised to establish ‘lower courts’ such as magistrates and customary courts. However, 
‘the lower courts’ do not have constitutional recognition or protection.XLIV The magistrates 
and the kadis of the lower courts are not considered a part of what the Constitution refers 
to as ‘judicial officer’.  
As a rule, federal courts are expected to exercise jurisdiction on federal matters while 
state courts are expected to exercise jurisdiction on matters that are assigned to the 
states.XLV The dual judicial federalism that is envisaged under the Constitution is however 
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much more moderated since ‘there is a greater degree of interdependence between the 
[federal and state government] in relation to the judiciary… than in relation to the 
legislative and executive branches’.XLVI For instance, the Constitution authorises state 
courts to hear cases relating to federal mattersXLVII thereby extending the judicial powers of 
state courts ‘to justiciable matters arising under laws made by the National Assembly’. This, 
however, excludes those federal matters that are designated as original jurisdiction of one 
of the federal courts.XLVIII For instance, the Supreme Court has original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputes between governments. The Court of Appeal has original 
jurisdiction on matters relating to presidential elections. The Federal High Court has 
original jurisdiction over a long list of federal matters. State courts can thus hear cases 
relating to federal matters unless those matters are within the original and exclusive 
competence of one of the federal courts.  
On the other hand, the Nigerian Constitution, unlike the Ethiopian Constitution, does 
not even provide for the establishment of a state supreme court or a state court of appeal. 
The Supreme Court, for instance, not only serves as the country’s constitutional court, as is 
the practice in Ethiopia, it also has the final say on ‘the interpretation and application of all 
laws in the country, including customary laws and Sharia’.XLIX Thus, in the words of 
Suberu, the Nigerian Constitution has created a ‘unified judicial structure in which federal 
courts … and the sub-federal judicature (especially, the state High Court and Customary, 
or Sharia, Court of Appeal) are part of a single appellate hierarchy, with the Supreme Court 
(which exists only at the federal level) at the apex’.L 
 
3.2. Appointment of judges  
The Supreme Court has a maximum of 22 justices one of whom is the Chief Justice.LI 
The Court of Appeal has 50 judges including the President of the Court.LII At least three of 
the judges in the Court of Appeal are required to have knowledge of Sharia personal laws 
and at least other three judges are expected to be knowledgeable in customary laws.LIII This 
is because, as will be discussed below, the Court of Appeal exercises appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that are decided by a State Sharia Court of Appeal and a State Customary Court 
of Appeal. The Constitution provides that the federal legislature determines the number 
judges of the Federal High Court. LIV  
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The National Judicial Council (NJC)LV is empowered to nominate those who qualify for 
appointment as justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal and the judges and 
Kadis (judges deciding cases on the basis of Sharia) of the Federal High Court.LVI A Federal 
Judicial Service Commission advises the NJC in this regard.LVII The President can only 
make appointment on the basis of the recommendation of the NJC. He or she can 
however refuse to appoint one or all of the NJC’s nominees. The Constitution enjoins the 
President to seek confirmation form the Senate on the appointment of all the justices of 
the Supreme Court and all of the heads of the federal courts i.e. the Chief Justice, the 
President of the Court of Appeal, and the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court.LVIII To 
this extent, the states, through their three elected senators each, can play an important role 
in bring state interests to bear on appointments to the highest judicial offices. However, the 
President is not required to seek such confirmation regarding the appointment of the rest 
of the justices of the Court of Appeal as well as the judges of the Federal High Court. 
At state level, a governor of a state retains the power to appoint a chief judge of a state 
high court, a grand kadis of a state sharia court of appeal and a president of state customary 
courts of appeal.LIX Such appointments are again based on the recommendation of the 
NJC. A State Judicial Service Commission (SJSC)LX, which is also responsible for the 
administration of state courts, merely advises the NCJ in the selection of ‘suitable persons 
for appointment’ in state courts. It does not make any recommendation to the state 
governors in this regard. The NJC makes the actual recommendations to state governors 
on the appointment of judges and kadis of a state high court, a sharia court of appeal and a 
customary court of appeal.LXI State governors also appoint other judges and kadis of state 
courts, including magistrates and kadis of state sharia courts and customary courts, only 
upon the recommendation of NJC. The Constitution expressly requires the confirmation 
by a State House of Assembly of the appointment of a chief judge of a state high court, a 
grand kadi of a state sharia court of appeal, and the president of a state customary court of 
appeal. It is however silent on whether such confirmation is needed with regard to the 
appointment of judges other than these three.  
From the above it can be gathered that there are features of duality as well as 
integration in the manner that the judges and kadises of the federal and state courts, sharia 
courts and customary courts are appointed. As mentioned above, the NJC is key to the 
appointment of judges both for federal and state courts. Since its members are 
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predominately from the federal judiciary, the NJC is viewed as an essentially federal 
institution. LXII In fact, according to section 153(1)(i) of the Constitution, the NJC is one of 
the ‘federal executive bodies’. This federal executive organ has the power to discipline and 
dismiss federal and state judges. It is also authorised to ‘to collect, control and disburse 
moneys, capital and recurrent, for the judiciary’.LXIII The dualism in the federal system is 
thus watered down to the extent of the NJC’s involvement in the above respect. Taking 
into account the role of the NJC in appointment and dismissal of judges and kadis of state 
courts, AE Obidimma and EOC Obidimma conclude that ‘the 1999 Constitution … 
established a federal judiciary for the federation and a quasi-federal judiciary for the states’.LXIV 
For the same reason, Suberu also refers to the state High Courts, Sharia Courts of Appeal 
and Customary Courts of Appeal as ‘sub-federal judicature’.LXV 
What can perhaps be considered as truly state judiciary in Nigeria are the lower courts, 
which include the magistrate, the sharia court, and customary courts. However, these 
courts do not have constitutional recognition and are subject to the integrated appeal 
system. Moreover, as mentioned above, these are not covered by what the Constitution 
refers to as ‘judicial offices’ and the judges and kadis of these courts are not also deemed 
‘judicial officers’.LXVI The NJC is not involved in the appointment of the judges and kadis 
of these courts. They are rather ‘appointed, promoted and subjected to disciplinary control 
of’ an SJC, which is as per the Constitution, a state executive organ.LXVII  
 
3.3. Language  
The Constitution explicitly makes English the working language of the National 
Assembly and a state’s Houses of Assembly even though there are hundreds of languages 
that are spoken in Nigeria, the major ones being Hausa, Yeruba, Ibibio, Edo, Kanuri, Igbo 
and Fulfulde.LXVIII Indeed, the National Assembly may conduct its business in Hausa, Ibo 
and Yoruba, but only if arrangements are made to this effect.LXIX A House of Assembly 
may also use, in addition to English, one or more of the languages spoken in the state, to 
conduct its business if the House so resolves.LXX  
The Constitution is, however, silent on the working language of the courts. The 
Supreme Court however declared in several decisions that the language of superior courts 
of the country is English and that any document written in any other language, and which 
needs to be submitted to these courts, has to be translated to into English.LXXI As stated 
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above, the Constitution recognises Sharia and customary laws. In most cases, the Quran, 
Hadith and other sources of Sharia are not translated into local languages and are found 
only in Arabic. However, the kadis use the language of a particular community to 
administer justice using Sharia laws.LXXII Judges of customary courts also use local 
languages of a specific area to decide cases.LXXIII 
 
3.4. Federal jurisprudence  
Rotimi Suberu summarises the impacts of the courts, especially the Nigerian Supreme 
Court, in terms of impacting the federal system of the country as more ‘centralist than 
federalist’ with minimal ‘transformational impact on Nigeria’s centralized federal 
system’.LXXIV Yet, according to Suberu, there are two aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
decision which have some differing impacts on the Nigerian federal system: decisions on 
disputes between the federal government and the states on division of revenue; and those 
relating to the place and status of local government. 
The Court’s decisions on revenue related disputes between the federal government and 
states were mostly centralist which, Suberu maintains, time and again confirmed the federal 
government’s ‘fiscal hegemony’.LXXV Its decision on the issue of on-shore and off-shore oil 
dichotomy in AG Federation v AG Abia State & OrsLXXVI and AG Ogun State & Ors v AG 
Federation was one impacting on the division of revenue between the federal and state 
governments.LXXVII For the purpose of determining the 13 per cent derivation from oil 
revenue that goes to oil-producing states, the federal government divided oil revenue into 
those that are collected from on-shore oil and off-shore oil drilling. According to the 
federal government no individual state, including those adjacent to the sea are entitled to 
13 per cent of the oil revenue collected from off-shore oil drilling. Some littoral states 
opposed this decision and sued the federal government. The Supreme Court decided in 
favour of the federal government. Later the National Assembly passed a law entitling 
littoral states for 13 percent of off-shore oil revenue if and when the oil is extracted from 
an area which is “two-hundred-meter water depth Isobaths’ and adjacent to a littoral state. 
When this law was challenged in AG Ogun State & Ors v AG Federations by non-oil 
producing states, the Supreme Court once again decided in favour of the federal 
government upholding the constitutionality of the Act passed by the National Assembly. In 
AG Ogun State & Ors v AG Federation, the Supreme Court decided that the federal 
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government was entitled deduct certain revenue from federally collected revenue before 
paying those in to the Federation Account. In AG Abia State & Ors v AG Federation, the 
Supreme Court found to be constitutional President Obasanajo’s decision to federalize 7.5 
percent of the revenue in the Federation Account, which was previously ‘designated as 
special funds’ to be used for the purpose of financial stabilisation and the like. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s decision on the place and status of local 
government in the federal matrix has been decidedly in favour of the states.LXXVIII In several 
cases, the Supreme Court has protected the autonomy of the states by preventing the 
federal government from having a direct relationship with local government and by 
insisting that everything relating to local government has to pass through the states. For 
instance, in AG Ogun & Ors v AG Federation (2002)LXXIX, the Supreme Court decided that 
the federal government cannot directly transfer to local government revenue that is 
designated as the share of the latter and that it has to be channeled through the states. The 
Supreme Court also ruled in AG Abia & Ors v. AG Federation (2002)LXXX that the states 
retain an exclusive power to regulate local elections, including determining the tenure of 
local councils.  
 
3.5. Concluding remarks  
Although the Nigerian judiciary appear to be dualist, both in law and practices it is 
unified in terms of its institutional structure and material jurisdiction. While the states 
through the Senate confirmation hearings have some say in federal appointments it is 
restricted to the highest judicial offices only. The federal institution, the NJC, on the other 
hand, plays a major role in the appointments to the state high courts. A further indication 
of the integrated nature of the judicial system is the use of English as the court language in 
superior courts (bar, of course the Sharia and customary courts). Given the integrated 
nature of the court system, it is not surprising that that the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court is also more centralist than federalist. Where it has defended the autonomy of the 
states it was against federal encroachment of states’ control over local government.  
 
 







Kenya’s 2010 Constitution introduced a devolved system of government with a 
national government at the centre and 47 counties as the second order of government. The 
Constitution does not provide for a third level of government, although it envisages that 
the counties may create sub-county administrative units in urban areas.LXXXI Counties are 
thus envisaged to take up the functions of both a meso-level government and a local 
government. While the Constitution provides a list of exclusive national functions, it is not 
clear that the list of county functions is of a similar nature, as extensive provision is made 
for the concurrency of powers.LXXXII  
 
4.1. The structure and jurisdiction of courts  
In Kenya there is ‘judicial unitarism’ in that the devolution of judicial function was 
never considered during the drafting of the 2010 ConstitutionLXXXIII According to Conrad 
Bosire, ‘[n]ot a single view was expressed to federalize or devolve judicial power during the 
entire constitutional review process in Kenya’.LXXXIV The result was thus that judicial 
matters are an exclusive national function.LXXXV 
The Kenyan judiciary consists of superior and subordinate courts in which both courts 
form a single judiciary. The superior courts are the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, 
and the High Court. LXXXVI Specialized courts that may be established through legislation to 
resolve labour disputes and those relating to land and the environment, are also considered 
parts of the superior court. LXXXVII The subordinate courts include magistrates, kadhis’ 
(Islamic courts) and courts martial.LXXXVIII The Chief Justice and his or her deputy serve as 
the head and deputy head of the entire judiciary and the Chief Registrar is the chief 
administrator.LXXXIX There is also a single Judicial Service Commission.XC  
The Constitution nevertheless encourages the use of alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms including the use of traditional courts so long as the decisions of such 
tribunals does not result in violation of human rights, the Constitution and other laws.XCI  
At county level, practice shows that the counties have established county courts using 
the ‘incidental’ clause under Section 185(2) of the Constitution.XCII These courts may be 
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labeled county courts, but they are part of the unitary judicial system; the judiciary seconds 
magistrate to try petty offences such as littering, parking violations, garbage dumping and 
the like.XCIII 
The Constitution defines the functional jurisdiction of the superior courts. The 
Constitution is silent on the jurisdictions of the special superior courts and the subordinate 
courts, authorising Parliament to define the jurisdictions of such courts through ordinary 
legislation.XCIV 
 
4.2 Appointment of judges  
The president of the country is constitutionally authorised to appoint the judges of the 
superior and subordinate courts, including the chief justice and the deputy chief justice, of 
the country.XCV He or she does so based on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC).XCVI The president needs the consent of the National Assembly (NA), 
the popular house of the Kenyan Parliament, with respect to the appointment of a chief 
justice and a deputy chief justice.XCVII A law requiring the JSC to provide the president with 
a list of three nominees for the latter to select and appoint the chief justice was declared 
unconstitutional.XCVIII Now the JSC nominates a single person for the office and the 
president has no option but to appoint the person.XCIX The president has the power to 
appoint other judges upon the recommendation of the JSC with no need to seek the 
approval of the NA.C  
This process begs the question whether the counties are directly or indirectly involved 
in the appointment of judges. As indicated above, judicial power is within the exclusive 
competence of the national government; the Constitution thus does not envisage the 
involvement of the counties in the appointment of judges. According to Bosire the Kenyan 
judiciary is simply ‘an independent arm of national government operationally, financially, 
and institutionally’.CI He further states that the counties play no role in the appointment of 
judges and that even the ‘Senate, which represents and safeguards the interests of counties 










As all African countries, Kenya has a multilingual society. Over 40 languages are 
spoken in the country. English (due to the country’s colonial history) and Kiswahili are the 
most widely used languages in the country. The Constitution has thus recognised Kiswahili 
as the national language of the country while recognising both English and Kiswahili as 
official languages of the country.CIII  
English has been used as the language of courts in Kenya since the country attained 
independence, but lower courts used Kiswahili in oral examination. However, ‘all records 
of the court proceedings [were kept in English] since the records had ‘to be verified by the 
high court’.CIV This practice is still maintained even if the Constitution recognises Kiswahili 
as the national first language.  
  
4.4. Devolution jurisprudence  
The Kenyan superior courts, especially the Supreme Court, are playing an increasingly 
important role in giving ‘shape and texture’ to the Kenyan system of devolution. The 
counties are also increasingly using courts to assert their rights and defend their autonomy. 
The role of the courts in guarding the ‘constitutional space’ of the counties is especially 
important since, given the decades old centralized system of the country, there is often an 
impulsive temptation from the central government to erode the constitutional space of the 
counties. The courts also play important role of defining the beginning and end of the 
constitutional space of each level of government given that the constitution is less than 
clear in defining the competences of the two levels of government.  
Bosire argues that the courts have given shape and texture to the devolved system in 
three ways: by analyzing both the ‘nature of the [devolution] system’ and the ‘significance 
and thrust’ of the system, and by determining specific matters ‘including sharing or 
revenue, powers and functions, and intergovernmental relations among other issues’.CV In 
terms of determining the ‘nature’ of the Kenyan devolved system, the issue was whether 
and how the system was similar or different from a federal system. In Speaker of the Senate v 
Speaker of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court has underscored that the Kenyan 
devolved system is not a federal system and that it is ‘based on a unitary system’ in which 
the centre gave up some of its power to counties.CVI With regard to the objectives of the 
devolved system, the Court declared that the devolved system is as important as the 
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Constitution itself and ‘denotes self-empowerment, freedom, opportunity, self-respect, 
dignity and recognition’.CVII The courts have decided on several cases in which it protected 
functional competences and revenue raising powers of the counties. For instance, the 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was declared unconstitutional.CVIII 
 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
The devolution of judicial authority was not an issue in Kenya and the unified structure 
of the court was taken as a given by the drafters of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. The 
resultant uniform court system is thus also evidence of the highly centralised ‘federal’ 
character of the Kenyan state, although at the fringes the counties are using their incidental 
powers to pay from ‘local’ courts, presided over to by national magistrates. In this centrist 
scheme the counties or their senators play no role in the appointment of the judiciary. The 
use of English as the only court language further emphasizes the unitary nature of the court 
system. Given the centrist slant of the constitution, the superior courts, in particular the 
Supreme Court, have however played a significant role in giving meaning and content to 
the devolution provisions. The Supreme Court has depicted devolution as one of the key 
elements of the new constitution and has not shied away from giving them full effect.  
 
5. South Africa 
 
The “negotiated revolution” ending white minority rule in April 1994 included a system 
of multilevel government.CIX The African National Congress, the dominant liberation 
movement, insisting on a strong centralized state to undo the ravages of apartheid 
reluctantly compromised on the establishment of provinces, but was more enthusiastic on 
securing a strong local government sphere of government. The 1996 Constitution, building 
on the 1993 Interim Constitution, established three spheres of government – the national, 
provincial and local governments – but with strong central control. It has thus been 
described as being a unitary state with federal features.. Provinces have an emaciated list of 
exclusive competences, with the bulk of powers being concurrent with the national 
government, accompanied by a qualified override clause in favour of the latter. Local 
government has a list of powers which are exclusive to the extent that the national or 
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provincial governments may regulate those powers. The national government’s powers are 
thus those concurrent with the provinces and all residual matters.  
As the administration of justice, including the judiciary, is not listed in either the 
provinces’ lists of exclusive or concurrent powers, it is a matter that falls within the 
exclusive domain of the national government. It is thus not one of the country’s ‘federal 
features’. However, there are some small elements that do reflect a federal dimension in the 
structure of the courts and the composition of the bench. However, very little attention is 
given to regional local languages as language of record. With regard to a ‘federal’ 
jurisprudence, the Courts have, on the whole, favoured the ‘hourglass’ approach; 
strengthening the national and local spheres of government at the expense of the provinces 
in the middle.CX  
 
5.1. The structure and jurisdiction of courts 
 
From the outset during the negotiations for the 1993 Constitution and in the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1995-1996 there was little debate whether some judicial powers 
should be devolved to provinces. In line with the overall centrist approach advanced by the 
African National Congress, the judiciary was not to be a provincial matter. The result was 
that there was strong continuity of the uniform apartheid judicial structure (and judges) 
into the new democratic dispensation.  
Before 1994, a unified system, from the magistrates to the Supreme Court, culminating 
in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, was the norm. The Supreme Court had six 
divisions, one each for the four provinces, with the Cape Province, due to its geographical 
size, being sub-divided into three divisions: Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Cape 
Provincial Divisions. In line with grand apartheid, each of the ‘independent’ Bantustans - 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda - had its own judiciary, with a High Court 
and an appellate court.  
The new democratic dispensation brought some innovative measures but on the whole 
the courts structure remained intact. The most important innovation was the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court, as final arbiter on all matters constitutional, while the 
Appellate Division was renamed the Supreme Court of Appeal, with exclusive jurisdiction 
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over all matters non-constitutional.CXI This distinction was hard to maintain and in 2012 
the Constitutional Court was also given the power to adjudicate on all matters.CXII  
The ‘provincialisation’ of the courts took two decades to complete, namely the 
establishment of a High Court for each province. As a transitional measure, all courts 
functioning in 1994 continued to do so. Thus, the four Bantustan High Courts continue to 
dispense justice in the same territorial jurisdiction of the former Bantustans. It was fairly 
easy to established High Courts in the Western Cape (old Cape Provincial Division), 
Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Free State. The dismemberment of 
Transvaal Provincial Division was more problematic. The former Bophutatswana High 
Court become the North West High Court, the Venda High Court was subsumed into a 
new Limpopo High Court, and the last court to be established was the Mpumalanga High 
Court in 2017. It is only when the latter court is fully functional that the Gauteng High 
Court will serve only the Gauteng Province.  
At local government level one finds so-called ‘municipal courts’. They are courts, 
financially carried by a municipality, but presided over by a magistrate appointed by the 
Department of Justice. With a jurisdiction limited to the enforcement of municipal by-laws, 
it fits into the overall national judicial court structure.  
The Constitutional Court, as the court of final jurisdiction on constitutional matters, 
has thus also the final say on the federal arrangements. The Constitution thus makes 
specific provision that the Constitutional Court is the only court that can “decide disputes 
between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional 
status, powers and functions of any of those organs of state.”CXIII High Courts also have 
jurisdiction over constitutional matters, but where a High Court invalidates a national or 
provincial law, or presidential conduct, as being unconstitutional, there is an “automatic” 
review by the Constitutional Court; unless the Court confirms the invalidity, the law or 
conduct stands.CXIV 
 
5.2 Appointment of judicial officers 
 
Although the judiciary falls squarely outside the functional areas of provinces, the 
provinces do play an important role in judicial appointments through their indirect 
participation in the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Created in 1994 as a clear break 
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with the long-standing practice of executive appointments, the JSC sought to make the 
process of appointment more transparent and less controlled by the executive. It is a 
powerful institution. The president appoints the chief justice and his or her deputy after 
consultation with the JSC and the leaders of the political parties in the National Assembly. 
The president needs to consult the JSC with regard to the appointment of the president 
and deputy president of the Supreme Court of Appeal. When it comes to the nine justices 
of the Constitutional Court, the president appoints them from a list provided by the JSC 
(there must be three names more than the vacant positions). For the appointment of all 
other judges, the president must follow the JSC’s advice.  
The JSC’s members comprise: representatives from the judiciary (three, including the 
chief justice as chairperson); the minister of justice; the legal profession (four); law schools 
(one); the National Assembly (six, three of whom must be opposition MPs); National 
Council of Province delegates (NCOP) (four); presidential nominees (four); and the judge-
president and premier of a province where a matter concerns the High Court in that 
province (including appointments to the provincial High Court). 
The NCOP is the second house of Parliament, and as its name suggests, represents the 
provinces. Each of the nine provinces appoints a delegation of ten members to the NCOP 
(six permanently and four drawn from the provincial legislature itself). The power of the 
NCOP resides in their co-determination of national legislation affecting provinces 
(although a two thirds majority in the National Assembly may overcome an NCOP veto) 
and ratifying international treaties. As a body representing provincial interests, the NCOP’s 
four nominees to the JSC is only 16 per cent of a possible 25 members, but may be 
important in key decisions. The inclusion of the premier of a province in decisions 
affecting appointments to the provincial bench adds a further provincial flavour to process. 
In practice, though, the NCOP delegates follow party lines rather than advancing 
provincial interests. 
 
5.3 Court languages 
 
Sharply distancing itself from the apartheid practice of only recognizing two languages 
– Afrikaans and English – the new democratic dispensation saw eleven official languages 
constitutionally recognized. The percentage breakdown of the major language groups is: 
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IsiZulu (22.9); IsiXhosa (17.9); Afrikaans (14.4); Sepedi (9.2); English (8.6); Setswana (8.2); 
and Sesotho (7.7).CXV Furthermore, some of these languages have a geographical base, 
which has resulted in seven of the nine provinces having a majority language: KwaZulu-
Natal (IsiZulu); Eastern Cape (IsiXhosa); Western Cape (Afrikaans); Northern Cape 
(Afrikaans); North West (Setwana); Free State (SeSotho) and Limpopo (Sepedi). Effect is 
given to language preferences in provinces; each province may choose at least two 
languages for use in administration. For example, in the Western Cape, where Afrikaans is 
the majority language, English and IsiXhosa are also working languages. For 
communication between language groups, English has become the de facto lingua franca of 
South Africa. It took more than 20 years for this position to prevail also in the courts. 
During the apartheid era Afrikaans and English were the only languages of record, 
although any accused or witness may use its language of choice (through an interpreter). 
The protection of Afrikaans was, of course, no longer tenable, but remained on the statute 
book. It was only in 2017 that it lost its exalted position. Chief Justice Mogoeng announced 
that English will be the only language of record, the principal reason being efficiency; not 
all judges are proficient in all 11 languages.CXVI Even where the judge and the parties to a 
dispute are from the same language group, the trial is conducted in English, as there may 
be a prospect of appeal. This ruling has, of course, upset the Afrikaans legal fraternity, who 
lost their once privileged position. Although some judges have argued for the use of other 
indigenous languages as well, in the short to medium term, the courts will be uni-lingual. 
 
5.4 ‘Federal’ jurisprudenceCXVII  
 
The Constitutional Court viewed its task of interpreting the federal elements in a 
purposive manner, as it did the rest of the Constitution.CXVIII In a decision dealing with the 
appropriate assignment of functions to provinces in terms of the interim Constitution, the 
Court said, in response to an argument that provincial powers should be construed 
restrictively, as follows:  
In the interpretation of those schedules [listing provincial powers] there is no 
presumption in favour of either the national legislature or the provincial legislatures. The 
functional areas must be purposively interpreted in a manner which will enable the national 
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parliament and the provincial legislatures to exercise their respective legislative powers fully 
and effectively.CXIX  
Yet, a close reading of its subsequent judgments reveals that there has indeed been a 
consistent pattern of interpreting provincial powers restrictively. First, in certifying whether 
the Western Cape draft Provincial Constitution was in accordance with the provisions of 
the 1996 Constitution, it found that an electoral system different from that prescribed in 
the national Constitution, was not included in the broad scope of a permissive provision 
that allowed such provincial constitution to have ‘legislative and executives structures and 
procedures’ that differed from the national constitution.CXX Secondly, the Court interpreted 
a province’s meagre exclusive powers restrictively. CXXI So too was its analysis of provinces’ 
incidental powers.CXXII Thirdly, in clarifying the overlapping powers between provinces and 
local government, the Court consistently favoured the latter.CXXIII As noted above, the pro-
centre and pro-local decisions resulted in the powers of provinces being squeezed thin in 
an hourglass configuration. However, when it came to procedural matters, the Court 
adopted a generous interpretation as to when the NCOP should be part of the legislative 
process; any national bill that affects the interest of the provinces must also get the 
approval of the NCOP.CXXIV Consequently, laws that were adopted without such approval 
have been invalidated.CXXV  
It has been argued that the Constitutional Court’s parsimonious attitude towards 
provinces was at first influenced by the need for unity in the face of secessionist 
sentiments. This was bolstered by the poor service delivery record of the majority of 
provinces. However, given the governance failures at the national level, the Court may 
become more sympathetic towards well-functioning provinces.  
 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
The courts and their functioning reflect South Africa’s highly centralized federal 
system. Although the court structure was eventually aligned to the federal territorial 
arrangements, provinces play as such no role in the courts’ administration. Regional 
preferential languages, as adopted by provinces, have not become languages of court 
record. Despite the fact that the judiciary is not a provincial competence, the provinces, 
through their delegates in the NCOP, have potentially a significant role to play in 
appointments to the bench. Reflective also of the government’s ambiguous approach to 
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provinces, the courts have also not interpreted provincial powers generously. This may 
change, however, once provinces show themselves as an effective and efficient sphere of 
government in advancing socio-economic development.  
 
 6. Comparative observations  
 
At first glance it would seem that the administration of justice of two non-centrist 
federal countries (Nigeria and Ethiopia) would be quite different from the two unitary 
systems of South Africa and Kenya. From the brief overview it is apparent that the 
differences are not large; the dualist systems show decidedly unitary features, while South 
Africa, at least, has some federal traits. Only Kenya has an unadulterated centrist system.  
In the non-centrist countries, the court system reflects the configuration of the 
constituent units. Despite its dominant unitary nature, South Africa’s High Court structure 
is aligned with provincial boundaries, a feature which becomes significant when it comes to 
appointing judges. In Kenya with 47 counties, only at lower court level is alignment 
possible. It is also at this level that in the unitary South African and Kenyan systems that 
local or municipal courts are emerging; although these courts are staffed by national judicial 
officers, they are instituted and paid by municipalities and counties when they can meet a 
particular local need, thus introducing a tiny element of dualism.  
Despite the fact that Ethiopia and Nigeria are generally viewed as having dual federal 
systems, typical of fragile federal systems, the duality is overly tamed and the gravamen of 
judicial powers is more concentrated at the federal level. In Nigeria, courts of appeal are 
established only at federal level; there is thus no exclusive judicial authority at state level. In 
Ethiopia a similar situation prevails; the decisions of the highest state courts are reviewed 
by the federal courts also on state matters. Due to the political history of both countries, 
the judiciary is weak; their independence compromised by executive and political 
interference.  
The dualist systems in Nigeria and Ethiopia also hold sway with the appointment of 
judges; each level appoints in the main their own, although there is a varying degree of 
integration. The appointment of judges to the Nigerian Supreme Court and the heads of 
the federal courts appellate justices must be confirmed by the Senate, which represents the 
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states polities. In Ethiopia the states, on the other hand, have no say regarding the 
appointment of federal judges.  
In both countries, the states’ power of appointment is, however, attenuated since the 
federal governments are involved in the appointment of judges of state courts. In Ethiopia 
the FJAC is consulted regarding the appointment of judges of state courts. In Nigeria the 
NCJ, which is seen as a ‘federal institution’, has the authority to recommend qualified 
judges for state courts and the SJSCs play merely an advisory role in this regard.  
Despite the unitary nature of the South African judicial structure, provinces are 
indirectly represented in the JSC and play an important role in the appointment of judges. 
In Kenya, again as the most centralised ‘federation’ of the four countries, the counties have 
no say, even though the Senate, on this matter.  
Although all of the four countries have multilingual populations, with concentrations 
of linguistic communities in states, provinces and counties, only Ethiopia uses local 
languages in its court systems. This flows, of course, from the ethnic model of federalism 
Ethiopia has embraced; as the federal system was designed primarily to accommodate 
linguistic diversity, state courts are required to use the working language of the relevant 
state. Even so, in four of the nine states, Amharic is used as court language (as it is done in 
federal courts) despite it not being the mother tongue in any of the multi-ethnic states; it is 
a matter of convenience. In Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, all of which are trying to 
escape the burden of ethnicity, English, the colonial language, has become, constitutionally 
or otherwise, the only court language.  
Having no power of constitutional interpretation, both state and federal courts in 
Ethiopia play almost no role in giving shape and texture to the federal system. Also, its lack 
of independence from the executive and dominant political party has frequently been 
questioned. The judiciary in the other three countries, although functioning in essentially an 
integrated system, with notable degrees of independence, can play an important role in 
given effect to the federal content of their respective constitutions. The Nigerian Supreme 
Court have passed several judgements impacting on the federal system. Although its 
decisions are in general centrist in impact, some defended the autonomy of the states. In 
Kenya, the courts, specially the Supreme Court, are playing a major role of guarding the 
autonomy of counties from encroachment by the national government. The South African 
Constitutional Court, although its judgments on provincial matters have been criticised as 
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being pro-centre or pro-local government, has been outstanding in upholding the 
Constitution against executive onslaughts. Its unwavering commitment to constitutionalism 
provides basic security for upholding also the federal arrangements.  
In summary, the court system and judiciary of the four ‘federal’ countries are reflective 
of the degree of decentralised or centralised federalism a country’s constitution and 
practice display. Given that all four countries have, to varying degrees, highly centralised 
federal systems, it is thus no surprise that the judicial branch of government is, too, 
evidence of this reality. Consequently, the main difference between the four countries - the 
presence or absence of a non-centrist court system – matters not much.  
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